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TRUSTS-STATE

ACTION IN CHARITABLE

TRUSTs-Evans v. Newton,

382 U.S. 296 (1966).

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1914 United States Senator Augustus 0. Bacon devised a
hundred-acre tract in trust for the lives of his wife and two daughters, and upon the death of the last survivor the property was to
vest in the mayor and council of the city of Macon, Georgia, in
trust to be used as a "park and pleasure ground" for the benefit of
"white women, white girls, white boys and white children of the
City of Macon." The control of the park was vested in a board of
managers of seven white persons. For many years the city maintained the park on a segregated basis, but after it became apparent
that it could not constitutionally continue segregated maintenance,
Negroes were allowed to use the park. Thereupon, Newton and
other individual members of the board of managers brought an action in the state court alleging that the city of Macon had failed to
enforce the discriminatory provisions of the will and praying that
the city be removed as trustee, that the court appoint private
trustees, and that the legal title to the park be transferred to them.
The city answered admitting that it could not legally enforce racial
segregation and resigned as trustee. Evans and other Negro citizens
of Macon intervened on the grounds that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited the court from accepting the resignation of the city and appointing private trustees
for the purpose of operating this public property in a discriminatory
manner. Other heirs of Senator Bacon also intervened asking for
a reversion of the trust property to the Bacon estate in the event
that the prayer of the city was denied. The trial court, which was
sustained by the Georgia Supreme Court,' accepted the resignation
of the city as trustee and appointed three new private trustees,
finding it unnecessary to pass on the claims of the Bacon heirs.
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court in an opinion by
Justice Douglas held that the park could not be operated on a segregated basis even under private trustees and that the court was
barred from transferring title to the private trustees. Noting the
tradition of municipal control and that the record showed nothing
to indicate a disengagement, the majority attempted to limit the
holding to the fact that municipal involvement and management of
the park had not been sufficiently disproved merely by the substitution of private trustees for public trustees.2 However, the opin1 Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
2

Twice the opinion intimates that the court might have reached a different conclusion if a fully developed record had conclusively shown that
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ion heralds a broader meaning to "state action" by suggesting that
the public character of the park and the "municipal" nature of its
services require that it be subject to the commands of the fourteenth amendment regardless of who holds title. Justice White's
concurring opinion argued that the restrictive conditions of the
charitable trust could not be implemented because they were incurably tainted by discriminatory legislation that validated such
racial restrictions while leaving the validity of non-racial restriction
still in question, thus giving state inducement to racially restrictive
charitable trusts.3 Justice Black in his dissent thought that the
writ should have been denied since no federal constitutional question was decided by the lower state court. 4 Justice Harlan, joined
by Justice Stewart, also thought that the writ had been improvidently granted5 and further dissented on the grounds that the case
was merely one of private discrimination, beyond the protection of
the fourteenth amendment.
Perhaps the reason the writ of certiorari was granted in spite of
the unclear state of the record was to settle important questions of
constitutional law left open by the famous case, Pennsylvania v.
Board of Trusts.6 In his will Stephen Girard provided for a charitable trust for the maintenance of a school for poor white male orthe city had ended all involvement with the trust property. First, this
would seem to have been a good reason for the court to have refused
to adjudicate the constitutional issue. See the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 319 n.3 (1966). Second,
the reasoning of the majority that the public character of the park
requires that it be treated as a public institution leaves serious doubt
whether the park could be operated on a segregated basis even if the
city had in fact disengaged itself.
3 As the validity of a trust for general community purposes limited by
non-racial restrictions was still in doubt, the case was one where the
state had forbidden all private discrimination except racial discrimination. Such a statute involved the state to such a significant extent in
the trust plan as to reflect a state policy and therefore violate the
fourteenth amendment. ' Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
4 The Georgia lower court purported to hold only that no error was
committed under state law in accepting the resignation of the city as
trustee and the appointment of successor trustees. This was an adequate non-federal ground which was independent of the federal
question of whether the new trustee could voluntarily enforce the
racial restrictions. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935). The
majority avoided such problems by treating the federal question to be
whether, under the circumstances, the acceptance of the resignation of
the city and the appointment of new trustees amounted to "statesponsored racial inequality."
5 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 315 (1966).
0 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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phans. The city of Philadelphia was named trustee and the trust
was administered by a board of directors of that city. When the
board refused to admit two qualified Negro applicants, the Supreme Court held that it was acting as an agency of the state and
therefore engaged in state action proscribed by the fourteenth
amendment.7 On remand, the Pennsylvania courts decided that the
dominant purpose of Stephen Girard was to limit the college to
"white" orphan boys rather than to have the city as trustee, and
substituted private trustees; the exclusion of the Negro applicants8
was again sustained and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The outcome of the case was to establish that governmental trustees denote state action. This opened the possibility that charitable trusts could be within the confines of the fourteenth amendment, but left uncertain whether the amendment's restrictions could
be circumscribed by the transfer of title to private trustees.
The Evans case resolves the question by holding that discriminatory trusts established with a governmental trustee cannot
avoid the commands of the equal protection clause by a transfer to
private trustees. But with the introduction of the "public function" theory, the opinion creates new questions of whether all publicly oriented charitable trusts are not subject to constitutional restrictions.
II.

ACTIVE GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN
CHARITABLE TRUSTS

Ever since the Civil Rights Cases9 the fourteenth amendment
has been considered to be only a prohibition upon the states not
reaching to private discrimination by individuals. In all charitable trusts, the discrimination originates privately in the expressed
wishes of the settlor. But the settlor's actions are not completely
devoid of state involvement, for the power to dispose of property
at death is a privilege granted by law, and in addition the state
grants many benefits to charitable trusts which are not applicable
to ordinary dispositions. 10 This administrative control and the
7

See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will
of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957); Shanks, "State Action"
and the GirardEstate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 213 (1956).

8 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958),
appeal denied, cert. denied, Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 357 U.S.

570 (1958).
9 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

10 Most states provide that the attorney general or other governmental
agency shall be the official responsible for enforcing charitable trusts,
the trusts are granted sizable tax benefits from the local and federal
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state-conferred benefits had not been thought to sufficiently constitute state involvement," except in the clear case where a governmental agency was made trustee. It was to avoid all official governmental involvement that the Georgia court transferred title
and control to private trustees, 12 and yet the opinion suggests that
even if such transfer was accomplished in fact, the trust property
may not be managed on a privately segregated basis because it is of
a "municipal character." If such is to develop as the real basis of
Justice Douglas's opinion, the broadened meaning of "state action"
would affect almost all charitable trusts. 3
The majority opinion assumes as a basic premise that discrimination originating between private parties becomes subject to the
commands of the fourteenth amendment whenever it has become so
entwined with governmental management or control that governmental policies are involved, or when the private activity is so
impregnated with a governmental character as to be a governmental function. The first ground has long been accepted,14 but
seems inapposite where the governmental agency has been removed
as trustee. While the removal of a governmental trustee avoids the
problem of state control, yet the possibility remains that governmental policy favoring discriminatory trusts may be found in
government, the state may alter the terms of the trust through the
doctrine of cy pres, they are granted. perpetual existence, and have a
less stringent tort liability. It has been argued that these elements
involve the state to a significant extent in all charitable trusts,. and
the relevant consideration should be whether the restrictions impose
"irrational, invidious," discrimination prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. Clark, supra note 7, at 1009-15.
11 See, e.g., Guillory v. Administrators to Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674
(E.D. La. 1962).
12 Such attempts to transfer control to private parties has resulted in a
pattern of development whereby the definition of state action has been
consistently expanded to cover discrimination ostensibly in private
form in other areas. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward,
377 U.S. 218 (1964) (schools); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)
(restrictive covenants); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (franchise); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (restrictive covenant);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (franchise); Hampton v. City
of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, Ghiotto v.
Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (golf course).
'3 From the very nature of charitable trusts in benefiting the community,
it appears that almost all parallel analogous fields of governmential
activity would constitute "state action." For example private schools,
orphanages, libraries, museums, and old-folk homes. See Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 315 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
14 Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Turner v. City of Memphis,
369 U.S. 350 (1962); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715 (1961).
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state legislation. Georgia had enacted a series of statutes which
removed any uncertainty as to the validity of discriminatory
charitable trusts for parks. 1 Such legislation could be held to
indicate a state policy 6 favoring racially restrictive trusts and
evince a "coercive effect"'17 implicating the state in the charitable
trust. Whether such a pattern of legislative action may involve the
state in private discriminatory trusts was not decided by the
Evans case.' While this would have been a more logical ground for
the Court's opinion, 19 it would have left the way free to validate
racially discriminatory charitable trusts through the judicial process of the common law. However, the constitutional validity of a
discriminatory trust which was facilitated through a legislative pattern enabling the creation of such trusts must be seriously
questioned. 20 It is still undetermined whether a private charitable
trust for a clearly private purpose, in which the state was involved only through its qualifying legislation on trusts, and not in
the supervision, control,
or management of the property, would
2
constitute state action. '
In those rare cases where a charitable trust significantly entwines the government by the utilization of governmental trustees,
the tradition of governmental involvement prohibits the state from
sanctioning the transfer to "private trustees. ' 22 Once government
15 GA. CODE AwN. §§ 69-504, 69-505 (1957) provided for devises in trust
of land for parks to be limited by racial restrictions and empowered
municipalities to accept such trusts and enforce their exclusive use by
police provisions.
16 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
17 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963).
18 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 n.3 (1966).
19 The role of the state is much more evident where it has thus endorsed
such discrimination, but the scarcity of such qualifying legislation and
the possibility of its revocation followed by the upholding of similar
restrictions under the law of trusts probably induced the court to for-

sake such a limited holding. Id. at 302 (concurring opinion).
20

21
22

A legislative enactment "authorizing discriminatory classification based
exclusively on color" has been thought to be clearly violative of the
fourteenth amendment. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715, 726-27, 729 (1961). See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes
for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 485 (1962).
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
In other areas it is clear that a state cannot relieve itself of constitutional restrictions by transferring the management of its affairs to a
private organization. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S.
971 (1954); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Lawrence v. Hancock,
76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948). See Note, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 132

(1959).
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management and control is brought actively into union with the
trust, its influence
cannot be dissipated by the appointment of
"private trustees. 2 3 This is the more evident when the absence of
all continuing governmental
management and control of the park
24
in Evans is considered.
III.

PUBLIC FUNCTION THEORY AND DISCRIMINATORY
CHARITABLE TRUSTS

A tradition of prior municipal involvement in a charitable trust
is no longer the only test to determine whether such trusts are subject to the fourteenth amendment. For the real crux of the Evans
case was whether private trustees could observe the racial restrictions in the trust and voluntarily operate the park on a segregated basis. 25 The answer comes in the court's premise that some
charitable trusts may be "so impregnated with a governmental
character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations
placed upon state action." 26 From the fact that the services rendered even by a private park are municipal in nature, the public
character of the trust property required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the commands of the fourteenth amendment regardless of who held title.
It is this "public function" theory of state action that foretells
the greatest import for charitable trusts and which has invoked the
bitterest dissent. Almost all charitable trusts perform a service
that is in some way public, for their rationale is some beneficial
purpose of social interest to the community which justifies per23

Alternatively, the state continues to be responsible for discrimination
where it once sought to regulate private activity. and later seeks to
disengage itself. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

Pollak, Racial Discriminationand Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Pro-

fessor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 19-22 (1959). Such a ground
would invalidate racial restrictions in a trust -where the state passed
enabling legislation and then repealed it. See Henkin, supra note 20,
24

at 483 n.20.
The lower Georgia court relied upon In re Girard College Trusteeship,
391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958), as holding that the appointment of

private trustees removed all governmental control and action. The
park was not dependent upon governmental financial aid, as the trust
provided that the income from other property - should go towards its
maintenance. As for any inference of continuing municipal involvement, under the circumstances it would be more reasonable to assume
that the city would do everything it could to divorce itself from management of the park.
25 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (concurring opinion).
26 Id. at 299.
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2
mitting property to be devoted to that purpose in perpetuity.

7

However, the opinion admits that because the government has engaged in a particular activity does not necessarily mean that a charitable trust undertaking of the same character suffers the same constitutional inhibitions. 28 The only criteria offered is whether the
predominant character and purpose is traditionally municipal in
serving the .ihole community.
The theory that certain activities "clothed with a public interest" constitute state action subject to the fourteenth amendment
has a history beginning almost with the ratification of the amendment.2 9 Private persons exercising powers similar to those of the
governmei.t are subject to its limitations.3 0 And recently, it has
been argued that any activity by an enterprise "affected with a
public interest"3' constitutes state action. 32 The Evans case marks
the first lime, however, that a majority of the court has applied the
"public Iunction" theory to an activity that was not strictly gov33
ernmentl.
The basis for the "public function" theory in the area of chari27 BOGERT,

28
29

30

31

32

-33

TRUSTS

AND

TRusTEES

§

375

(2d

ed.

1964);

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND), TRUSTS § 368 (1959); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 368 (2d ed. 1956).
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966).
The view was first advanced by the first Justice Harlan in his dissent
to the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883). See Canfield, Jr., "Our
Constitution is Color Blind: " Mr. Justice Harlan and Modern Problems
of Civil Rights, 32 U. KAN.CITY L. REV. 292 (1964).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Kerr v.
Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 721 (1945).
The term was adopted into constitutional law in Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113 (1877), which adopted it as the test for the validity of price
regulations by the state. The phrase was attributed to Lord Hale, who
wrote that when "private property is 'affected with a public interest'
it ceases to be juris privati only." For a criticism of this borrowing
from Lord Hale, see McAllister, Lord Hale and "Business Affected with
a Public Interest," 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 759 (1929); Hamilton, Affectation
With Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 298 (1964) (Goldberg, J. concurring);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176 (1961) (Douglas, J. concurring).
But see the dissent of Justice Black as to the applicability of the doctrine in racial discrimination cases. Bell v. Maryland, supra at 341, n.37.
The doctrine had previously been limited to company-owned towns and
voting cases. The Court had declined to extend it to privately operated,
governmentally financed housing developments. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1941), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
981 (1950); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S.'886 (1948).
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table trusts is a dedication of one's property to public use. If the
settlor accepts the privilege of setting aside his property in perpetuitv for use by a segment of the public, he must do so subject to
34
the st-atutory and constitutional rights of others.
.9
he "public function" theory offers an inadequate standard for
dete -mining when a charitable trust shall be held to the limitations
of the fourteenth amendment. In the first place, all charitable
trusts by their nature are, in varying degrees, of a public nature.
Second, it is almost impossible to formulate acceptable criteria for
determining what is a public use. Third, any test devised would entangle the court in a case by case morass of determining which
charitable trusts were public.35 Fourth, such analysis avoids the
important considerations of the nature of the state's action and its
consequences.
IV. JUDICIAL ACTION IN AID OF DISCRIMINATION
As the "public function" theory is unacceptable, the real basis
of the Evans opinion may be found in the state's sponsorship of
racial inequality through its judicial process. In accepting the city's
resignation and appointing new trustees, the state judicially aided
private parties attempting to operate the park on a segregated
basis.3 6
Shelley v. Kraemer 7 established that the action of state courts
and judicial officers in their official capacities may constitute state
action, and that racially restrictive covenants may not be enforced.
Analogous to a restrictive covenant, the racial restrictions in a
charitable trust originate privately by the act of the settlor. If the
state is not otherwise involved in the trust, the restrictive provisions of the trust agreement may be effectuated by voluntary adherence to its terms.38
"The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
35 Any "public function" test is sure to suffer the same fate reserved for
the "affected with a public interest" test in the economic rate regulation area. From its first pronouncement, the Court was involved in
endless litigation as to what industries affected the public interest. In
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), such criteria was discarded
as not susceptible of definition and forming an unsatisfactory test.
36 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 320 n.4 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
37 334 U.S. 1 (1948); accord, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). See
Henkin, supranote 20; Note, Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State
Action Concept, 44 CAIF. L. REv. 718 (1956).
38 The court in Evans assumed arguendo that no constitutional difficulties
would be encountered by a charitable trust of a school or center for
34
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But if the state's judiciary is involved, it must first be determined if the nature of the judicial action is of the character as to
constitute state action. It is clear that not all actions by the
courts may be considered state action, for if this were true every
judicial action in relation to a charitable trust would be open to
possible constitutional objections. The Shelley case suggests that
only active intervention by the state courts constitutes "state action." The administration of a trust agreement or the probate of a
testamentary trust should not sufficiently involve the state. 39 However, enforcement of racial restrictions, 40 the application of the cy
pres doctrine, or the appointment of new trustees contrary to the
trust agreement involve greater judicial discretion than administrative actions. Such non-ministerial actions involve the state
"to a
41
significant extent" in the charitable plan of the testator.
After the requisite state action has been established, it is necessary to determine whether the character of the judicial action complained of is condemned by the fourteenth amendment. 42

It is

clear that not all acts of the state result in a denial of equal protection, 43 but only those involving purposeful, invidious discrimination. 44 It need hardly be doubted today that classifications based
upon race or color may constitute prohibited discrimination. However, certain discriminations may be upheld on the bases of a
"rational" classification in relationship to the purpose of the
45

trust.

the use of one race only as long as the state was in no way implicated
in the supervision, control, or management of the facility.
39 See Note, 20 OH1O ST. L.J. 132 (1959); Clark, Charitable Trusts, the

Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J.
979, 1003 n.94 (1957). The argument has been made and rejected that
the courts, on analogy to the Shelley case, may not enforce a discriminatory condition to a private gift or trust. Gordon v. Gordon, 332
Mass. 197, 208, 124 N.E.2d 228, 235 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947
(1955).
40 In Guillory v. Administrators to Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D.
La. 1962) the court held that no court could enforce racial restrictions
in the trust agreement, and the trustees were free to admit Negro
applicants in violation of such restrictions.
41 See Powers, The Racially Discriminatory CharitableTrust: A Suggested
Treatment, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 478, 485 (1965).
42 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 72 (1955).
43 Cf. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (by implication).
44 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 18 (1944).
Accord, Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
45 See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will
of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1012 (1957).

CASENOTES
In addition, the claim to equality must be balanced with any
competing constitutional claim.4 6 Under such balancing, the guarantee of freedom to worship protected by the first amendment
should sustain charitable trusts for the establishment of parochial
schools and other church related purposes. 47 However, the testator's liberty to devise his property to whom he chooses is clearly
outweighed in the Evans case by the claim to equality free from
classifications based on race.
Moreover, the effect of the state's appointment of private
trustees would have been to sanction discrimination where there
had been none before, since for several years the city had refrained
from enforcing the racial restrictions of the trust. As in the Shelley
the petitioncase, but for the active intervention of the state court,
48
ers could have been free to continue using the park.
Such an analysis as the above would probably also preclude the
possibility of a resulting trust in favor of the grantor's heirs where
the racial conditions of the trust have become incapable of being
carried out.4

9

Where the trust agreement itself contains a rever-

sion clause, the question becomes more difficult because the trust
terminates by its own limitations without the aid of a state court.
However, the time when the niceties of property law can thwart
constitutional rights is long past and enforcement of the reversion
would probably be denied.50 Any such questions could be avoided
46

47

48

49

50

See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. R.v. 473, 487-96. In any balancing test, one begins with the
principle that generally the state is responsible and is violating the
equal protection clause when its courts enforce private, irrational discrimination. Only when this claim to equality is outweighed by some
right constitutionally protected from state interference or which the
Constitution requires the state to prefer, may the state allow the discrimination. Such preferred rights might be the freedom of religion
and freedom of speech secured by the first amendment. See Musser
v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 101-03 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Evans case noted
that religious sects may maintain their own parochial schools, even
though the state would be prohibited from excluding religious groups
from public schools. See Clark, supra note 45, at 1011-12.
Accord, Guillory v. Administrators to Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674
(E.D. La. 1962), where if the court had held that the terms of the trust
were binding, the active intervention of the court would have prohibited the trustees from undertaking a voluntary, non-racial admission policy.
For alternate grounds for denying a reversion to the grantor's heirs,
see Powers, supra note 41, at 496. But cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 312 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting).
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, Ghiotto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 (1962); Capital Fed. Say. and

836

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 45, NO. 4 (1966)

by the purchase of any possible reversion from the grantor's
heirs.5 '
V. CONCLUSION
The charitable trust has become a major source of social beneficence and public welfare. Its significance extends from the national research foundations to the relatively limited municipal
trusts, but each affects large numbers of people. Added to this is
the American belief in allowing a person to dispose of his property
to whom he wishes and under whatever restrictions. However, it
has become evident that the great social influence made possible by
charitable trusts will not permit invidious, irrational discriminations. The answer in large part appears in requiring that charitable
trusts conform to the principle of equality contained in the fourteenth amendment.
While such a solution preserves the local law of charitable
trusts unaltered, it presents difficult problems in finding the necessary nexus of "state action." The Girard case established that
charitable trusts are subject to some constitutional limitations and
that a settlor could not actively engage the state in his charitable
plan by making it a trustee. The Evans case goes one step further
in denying the termination of governmental involvement by the
appointment of private trustees. Once governmental management
and control is brought actively into union with the trust, the property remains subject to the principle of equality. In addition, the
court suggests that the public character of certain charitable trusts
requires that they be treated as public institutions regardless of the
private character of the trustees. Such a "public function" theory
is unworkable for determining when a charitable trust conforms
to constitutional principles.
A more relevant and workable analysis is to determine whether
the state has actively interfered through its judicial process. Any
significant intervention constitutes "state action." It is then necessary to determine whether such action constitutes "invidious"
discrimination of the kind prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
The state's action may not be considered invidious if some countervailing constitutional right rationally supports it.
Robert S. Lingo '66
Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957).

Contra,

Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88
S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, Leeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
51 Leeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n, 2 RACE REr.. L. REP.
411 (1957).

